THE GEOPOLITICS OF CHINA: A Great Power Enclosed
Nov 22nd, '11, 07:14
THE GEOPOLITICS OF CHINA: A Great Power Enclosed
Contemporary China is an island. Although it is not surrounded by water (which borders only its eastern flank), China is bordered by terrain that is difficult to traverse in virtually any direction. There are some areas that can be traversed, but to understand China we must begin by visualizing the mountains, jungles and wastelands that enclose it. This outer shell both contains and protects China.
Internally, China must be divided into two parts: The Chinese heartland and the non-Chinese buffer regions surrounding it. There is a line in China called the 15-inch isohyet. On the east side of this line more than 15 inches of rain fall each year. On the west side annual rainfall is less than that. The bulk of the Chinese population lives east and south of this line. This is Han China, the Chinese heartland. It is where the vast majority of Chinese live and the home of the ethnic Han, what the world regards as the Chinese. It is important to understand that over a billion people live in an area about half the size of the United States.
The Chinese heartland is divided into two parts, northern and southern, which in turn is represented by two main dialects, Mandarin in the north and Cantonese in the south. These dialects share a writing system but are almost mutually incomprehensible when spoken. The Chinese heartland is defined by two major rivers -- the Yellow River in the north and the Yangtze in the South, along with a third lesser river in the south, the Pearl. The heartland is China's agricultural region. However -- and this is the single most important fact about China -- it has about one-third the arable land per person as the rest of the world. This pressure has defined modern Chinese history -- both in terms of living with it and trying to move beyond it.
A ring of non-Han regions surround this heartland -- Tibet, Xinjiang province (home of the Muslim Uighurs), Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. These are the buffer regions that historically have been under Chinese rule when China was strong and have broken away when China was weak. Today, there is a great deal of Han settlement in these regions, a cause of friction, but today Han China is strong.
These are also the regions where the historical threat to China originated. Han China is a region full of rivers and rain. It is therefore a land of farmers and merchants. The surrounding areas are the land of nomads and horsemen. In the 13th century, the Mongols under Ghenghis Khan invaded and occupied parts of Han China until the 15th century, when the Han reasserted their authority. Following this period, Chinese strategy remained constant: the slow and systematic assertion of control over these outer regions in order to protect the Han from incursions by nomadic cavalry. This imperative drove Chinese foreign policy. In spite of the imbalance of population, or perhaps because of it, China saw itself as extremely vulnerable to military forces moving from the north and west. Defending a massed population of farmers against these forces was difficult. The easiest solution, the one the Chinese chose, was to reverse the order and impose themselves on their potential conquerors.
There was another reason. Aside from providing buffers, these possessions provided defensible borders. With borderlands under their control, China was strongly anchored. Let's consider the nature of China's border sequentially, starting in the east along the southern border with Vietnam and Myanmar. The border with Vietnam is the only border readily traversable by large armies or mass commerce. In fact, as recently as 1975, China and Vietnam fought a short border war, and there have been points in history when China has dominated Vietnam. However, the rest of the southern border where Yunnan province meets Laos and Myanmar is hilly jungle, difficult to traverse, with almost no major roads. Significant movement across this border is almost impossible. During World War II, the United States struggled to build the Burma Road to reach Yunnan and supply Chiang Kai-shek's forces. The effort was so difficult it became legendary. China is secure in this region.
Hkakabo Razi, almost 19,000 feet high, marks the border between China, Myanmar and India. At this point, China's southwestern frontier begins, anchored in the Himalayas. More precisely, it is where Tibet, controlled by China, borders India and the two Himalayan states, Nepal and Bhutan. This border runs in a long ark past Pakistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan, ending at Pik Pobedy, a 25,000-foot mountain marking the border with China, Kirgyzstan and Kazakhstan. It is possible to pass through this border region with difficulty; historically, parts of it have been accessible as a merchant route. On the whole, however, the Himalayas are a barrier to substantial trade and certainly to military forces. India and China -- and China and much of Central Asia -- are sealed off from each other.
The one exception is the next section of the border, with Kazakhstan. This area is passable but has relatively little transport. As the transport expands, this will be the main route between China and the rest of Eurasia. It is the one land bridge from the Chinese island that can be used. The problem is distance. The border with Kazakhstan is almost a thousand miles from the first tier of Han Chinese provinces, and the route passes through sparsely populated Muslim territory, a region that has posed significant challenges to China. Importantly, the Silk Road from China ran through Xinjiang and Kazakhstan on its way west. It was the only way to go.
There is, finally, the long northern border first with Mongolia and then with Russia, running to the Pacific. This border is certainly passable. Indeed, the only successful invasion of China took place when Mongol horseman attacked from Mongolia, occupying a good deal of Han China. China's buffers -- Inner Mongolia and Manchuria -- have protected Han China from other attacks. The Chinese have not attacked northward for two reasons. First, there has historically not been much there worth taking. Second, north-south access is difficult. Russia has two rail lines running from the west to the Pacific -- the famous Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR) and the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM), which connects those two cities and ties into the TSR. Aside from that, there is no east-west ground transportation linking Russia. There is also no north-south transportation. What appears accessible really is not.
The area in Russia that is most accessible from China is the region bordering the Pacific, the area from Russia's Vladivostok to Blagoveschensk. This region has reasonable transport, population and advantages for both sides. If there were ever a conflict between China and Russia, this is the area that would be at the center of it. It is also the area, as you move southward and away from the Pacific, that borders on the Korean Peninsula, the area of China's last major military conflict.
Then there is the Pacific coast, which has numerous harbors and has historically had substantial coastal trade. It is interesting to note that, apart from the attempt by the Mongols to invade Japan, and a single major maritime thrust by China into the Indian Ocean -- primarily for trade and abandoned fairly quickly -- China has never been a maritime power. Prior to the 19th century, it had not faced enemies capable of posing a naval threat and, as a result, it had little interest in spending large sums of money on building a navy.
China, when it controls Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, is an insulated state. Han China has only one point of potential friction, in the southeast with Vietnam. Other than that it is surrounded by non-Han buffer regions that it has politically integrated into China. There is a second friction point in eastern Manchuria, touching on Siberia and Korea. There is, finally, a single opening into the rest of Eurasia on the Xinjiang-Kazakh border.
China's most vulnerable point, since the arrival of Europeans in the western Pacific in the mid-19th century, has been its coast. Apart from European encroachments in which commercial interests were backed up by limited force, China suffered its most significant military encounter -- and long and miserable war -- after the Japanese invaded and occupied large parts of eastern China along with Manchuria in the 1930s. Despite the mismatch in military power and more than a dozen years of war, Japan still could not force the Chinese government to capitulate. The simple fact was that Han China, given its size and population density, could not be subdued. No matter how many victories the Japanese won, they could not decisively defeat the Chinese.
China is hard to invade; given its size and population, it is even harder to occupy. This also makes it hard for the Chinese to invade others -- not utterly impossible, but quite difficult. Containing a fifth of the world's population, China can wall itself off from the world, as it did prior to the United Kingdom's forced entry in the 19th century and as it did under Mao Zedong. All of this means China is a great power, but one that has to behave very differently than other great powers.
China's Geopolitical Imperatives
China has three overriding geopolitical imperatives:
Maintain internal unity in the Han Chinese regions.
Maintain control of the buffer regions.
Protect the coast from foreign encroachment.
Maintaining Internal Unity
China is more enclosed than any other great power. The size of its population coupled with its secure frontiers and relative abundance of resources, allows it to develop with minimal intercourse with the rest of the world, if it chooses. During the Maoist period, for example, China became an insular nation, driven primarily by internal interests and considerations, indifferent or hostile to the rest of the world. It was secure and, except for its involvement in the Korean War and its efforts to pacify restless buffer regions, was relatively peaceful. Internally, however, China underwent periodic, self-generated chaos.
The weakness of insularity for China is poverty. Given the ratio of arable land to population, a self-enclosed China is a poor China. Its population is so poor that economic development driven by domestic demand, no matter how limited it might be, is impossible. However, an isolated China is easier to manage by a central government. The great danger in China is a rupture within the Han Chinese nation. If that happens, if the central government weakens, the peripheral regions will spin off, and China will then be vulnerable to foreigners taking advantage of Chinese weakness.
For China to prosper, it has to engage in trade, exporting silk, silver and industrial products. Historically, land trade has not posed a problem for China. The Silk Road allowed foreign influences to come into China and the resulting wealth created a degree of instability. On the whole, however, it could be managed.
The dynamic of industrialism changed both the geography of Chinese trade and its consequences. In the mid-19th century, when Europe -- led by the British --compelled the Chinese government to give trading concessions to the British, it opened a new chapter in Chinese history. For the first time, the Pacific coast was the interface with the world, not Central Asia. This in turn, massively destabilized China.
As trade between China and the world intensified, the Chinese who were engaged in trading increased their wealth dramatically. Those in the coastal provinces of China, the region most deeply involved in trading, became relatively wealthy while the Chinese in the interior (not the buffer regions, which were always poor, but the non-coastal provinces of Han China) remained poor, subsistence farmers.
The central government was balanced between the divergent interests of coastal China and the interior. The coastal region, particularly its newly enriched leadership, had an interest in maintaining and intensifying relations with European powers and with the United States and Japan. The more intense the trade, the wealthier the coastal leadership and the greater the disparity between the regions. In due course, foreigners allied with Chinese coastal merchants and politicians became more powerful in the coastal regions than the central government. The worst geopolitical nightmare of China came true. China fragmented, breaking into regions, some increasingly under the control of foreigners, particularly foreign commercial interests. Beijing lost control over the country. It should be noted that this was the context in which Japan invaded China, which made Japan's failure to defeat China all the more extraordinary.
Mao's goal was three-fold, Marxism aside. First, he wanted to recentralize China -- re-establishing Beijing as China's capital and political center. Second, he wanted to end the massive inequality between the coastal region and the rest of China. Third, he wanted to expel the foreigners from China. In short, he wanted to recreate a united Han China.
Mao first attempted to trigger an uprising in the cities in 1927 but failed because the coalition of Chinese interests and foreign powers was impossible to break. Instead he took the long march to the interior of China, where he raised a massive peasant army that was both nationalist and egalitarian and, in 1948, returned to the coastal region and expelled the foreigners. Mao re-enclosed China, recentralized it, and accepted the inevitable result. China became equal but extraordinarily poor.
China's primary geopolitical issue is this: For it to develop it must engage in international trade. If it does that, it must use its coastal cities as an interface with the world. When that happens, the coastal cities and the surrounding region become increasingly wealthy. The influence of foreigners over this region increases and the interests of foreigners and the coastal Chinese converge and begin competing with the interests of the central government. China is constantly challenged by the problem of how to avoid this outcome while engaging in international trade.
Controlling the Buffer Regions
Prior to Mao's rise, with the central government weakened and Han China engaged simultaneously in war with Japan, civil war and regionalism, the center was not holding. While Manchuria was under Chinese control, Outer Mongolia was under Soviet control and extending its influence (Soviet power more than Marxist ideology) into Inner Mongolia, and Tibet and Xinjiang were drifting away.
At the same time that Mao was fighting the civil war, he was also laying the groundwork for taking control of the buffer regions. Interestingly, his first moves were designed to block Soviet interests in these regions. Mao moved to consolidate Chinese communist control over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, effectively leveraging the Soviets out. Xinjiang had been under the control of a regional war lord, Yang Zengxin. Shortly after the end of the civil war, Mao moved to force him out and take over Xinjiang. Finally, in 1950 Mao moved against Tibet, which he secured in 1951.
The rapid-fire consolidation of the buffer regions gave Mao what all Chinese emperors sought, a China secure from invasion. Controlling Tibet meant that India could not move across the Himalayas and establish a secure base of operations on the Tibetan Plateau. There could be skirmishes in the Himalayas, but no one could push a multi-divisional force across those mountains and keep it supplied. So long as Tibet was in Chinese hands, the Indians could live on the other side of the moon. Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria buffered China from the Soviet Union. Mao was more of a geopolitician than an ideologue. He did not trust the Soviets. With the buffer states in hand, they would not invade China. The distances, the poor transportation and the lack of resources meant that any Soviet invasion would run into massive logistical problems well before it reached Han China's populated regions, and become bogged down -- just as the Japanese had.
China had geopolitical issues with Vietnam, Pakistan and Afghanistan, neighboring states with which it shared a border, but the real problem for China would come in Manchuria or, more precisely, Korea. The Soviets, more than the Chinese, had encouraged a North Korean invasion of South Korea. It is difficult to speculate on Joseph Stalin's thinking, but it worked out superbly for him. The United States intervened, defeated the North Korean Army and drove to the Yalu, the river border with China. The Chinese, seeing the well-armed and well-trained American force surge to its borders, decided that it had to block its advance and attacked south. What resulted was three years of brutal warfare in which the Chinese lost about a million men. From the Soviet point of view, fighting between China and the United States was the best thing imaginable. But from Stratfor's point of view, what it demonstrated was the sensitivity of the Chinese to any encroachment on their borderlands, their buffers, which represent the foundation of their national security.
Protecting the Coast
With the buffer regions under control, the coast is China's most vulnerable point, but its vulnerability is not to invasion. Given the Japanese example, no one has the interest or forces to try to invade mainland China, supply an army there and hope to win. Invasion is not a meaningful threat.
The coastal threat to China is economic, and most would not call it a threat. As we saw, the British intrusion into China culminated in the destabilization of the country, the virtual collapse of the central government and civil war. It was all caused by prosperity. Mao had solved the problem by sealing the coast of China off to any real development and liquidating the class that had collaborated with foreign business. For Mao, xenophobia was integral to natural policy. He saw foreign presence as undermining the stability of China. He preferred impoverished unity to chaos. He also understood that, given China's population and geography, it could defend itself against potential attackers without an advanced military-industrial complex.
His successor, Deng Xiaoping, was heir to a powerful state in control of China and the buffer regions. He also felt under tremendous pressure politically to improve living standards, and he undoubtedly understood that technological gaps would eventually threaten Chinese national security. He took a historic gamble. He knew that China's economy could not develop on its own. China's internal demand for goods was too weak because the Chinese were too poor.
Deng gambled that he could open China to foreign investment and reorient the Chinese economy away from agriculture and heavy industry and toward export-oriented industries. By doing so he would increase living standards, import technology and train China's workforce. He was betting that the effort this time would not destabilize China, create massive tensions between the prosperous coastal provinces and the interior, foster regionalism or put the coastal regions under foreign control. Deng believed he could avoid all that by maintaining a strong central government, based on a loyal army and communist party apparatus. His successors have struggled to maintain that loyalty to the state and not to foreign investors, who can make individuals wealthy. That is the bet that is currently being played out.
China's Geopolitics and its Current Position
From a political and military standpoint, China has achieved its strategic goals. The buffer regions are intact and China faces no threat in Eurasia. It sees a Western attempt to force China out of Tibet as an attempt to undermine Chinese national security. For China, however, Tibet is a minor irritant; China has no possible intention of leaving Tibet, the Tibetans cannot rise up and win, and no one is about to invade the region. Similarly, the Uighur Muslims represent an irritant in Xinjiang and not a direct threat. The Russians have no interest in or capability of invading China, and the Korean peninsula does not represent a direct threat to the Chinese, certainly not one they could not handle.
The greatest military threat to China comes from the United States Navy. The Chinese have become highly dependent on seaborne trade and the United States Navy is in a position to blockade China's ports if it wished. Should the United States do that, it would cripple China. Therefore, China's primary military interest is to make such a blockade impossible.
It would take several generations for China to build a surface navy able to compete with the United States Navy. Simply training naval aviators to conduct carrier-based operations effectively would take decades -- at least until these trainees became admirals and captains. And this does not take into account the time it would take to build an aircraft carrier and carrier-capable aircraft and master the intricacies of carrier operations.
For China, the primary mission is to raise the price of a blockade so high that the Americans would not attempt it. The means for that would be land- and submarine-based-anti-ship missiles. The strategic solution is for China to construct a missile force sufficiently dispersed that it cannot be suppressed by the United States and with sufficient range to engage the United States at substantial distance, as far as the central Pacific.
In order for this missile force to be effective, it would have to be able to identify and track potential targets. Therefore, if the Chinese are to pursue this strategy, they must also develop a space-based maritime reconnaissance system. These are the technologies that the Chinese are focusing on. Anti-ship missiles and space-based systems, including anti-satellite systems designed to blind the Americans, represent China's military counter to its only significant military threat.
China could also use those missiles to blockade Taiwan by interdicting ships going to and from the island. But the Chinese do not have the naval ability to land a sufficient amphibious force and sustain it in ground combat. Nor do they have the ability to establish air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. China might be able to harass Taiwan but it will not invade it. Missiles, satellites and submarines constitute China's naval strategy.
For China, the primary problem posed by Taiwan is naval. Taiwan is positioned in such a way that it can readily serve as an air and naval base that could isolate maritime movement between the South China Sea and the East China Sea, effectively leaving the northern Chinese coast and Shanghai isolated. When you consider the Ryukyu Islands that stretch from Taiwan to Japan and add them to this mix, a non-naval power could blockade the northern Chinese coast if it held Taiwan.
Taiwan would not be important to China unless it became actively hostile or allied with or occupied by a hostile power such as the United States. If that happened, its geographical position would pose an extremely serious problem for China. Taiwan is also an important symbolic issue to China and a way to rally nationalism. Although Taiwan presents no immediate threat, it does pose potential dangers that China cannot ignore.
There is one area in which China is being modestly expansionist -- Central Asia and particularly Kazakhstan. Traditionally a route for trading silk, Kazakhstan is now an area that can produce energy, badly needed by China's industry. The Chinese have been active in developing commercial relations with Kazakhstan and in developing roads into Kazakhstan. These roads are opening a trading route that allows oil to flow in one direction and industrial goods in another.
In doing this, the Chinese are challenging Russia's sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. The Russians have been prepared to tolerate increased Chinese economic activity in the region while being wary of China's turning into a political power. Kazakhstan has been European Russia's historical buffer state against Chinese expansion and it has been under Russian domination. This region must be watched carefully. If Russia begins to feel that China is becoming too assertive in this region, it could respond militarily to Chinese economic power.
Chinese-Russian relations have historically been complex. Before World War II, the Soviets attempt to manipulate Chinese politics. After World War II, relations between the Soviet Union and China were never as good as some thought, and sometimes these relations became directly hostile, as in 1968, when Russian and Chinese troops fought a battle along the Ussuri River. The Russians have historically feared a Chinese move into their Pacific maritime provinces. The Chinese have feared a Russian move into Manchuria and beyond.
Neither of these things happened because the logistical challenges involved were enormous and neither had an appetite for the risk of fighting the other. We would think that this caution will prevail under current circumstances. However, growing Chinese influence in Kazakhstan is not a minor matter for the Russians, who may choose to contest China there. If they do, and it becomes a serious matter, the secondary pressure point for both sides would be in the Pacific region, complicated by proximity to Korea.
But these are only theoretical possibilities. The threat of an American blockade on China's coast, of using Taiwan to isolate northern China, of conflict over Kazakhstan -- all are possibilities that the Chinese must take into account as they plan for the worst. In fact, the United States does not have an interest in blockading China and the Chinese and Soviets are not going to escalate competition over Kazakhstan.
China does not have a military-based geopolitical problem. It is in its traditional strong position, physically secure as it holds its buffer regions. It has achieved it three strategic imperatives. What is most vulnerable at this point is its first imperative: the unity of Han China. That is not threatened militarily. Rather, the threat to that is economic.
Economic Dimensions of Chinese Geopolitics
The problem of China, rooted in geopolitics, is economic and it presents itself in two ways. The first is simple. China has an export-oriented economy. It is in a position of dependency. No matter how large its currency reserves or how advanced its technology or how cheap its labor force, China depends on the willingness and ability of other countries to import its goods -- as well as the ability to physically ship them. Any disruption of this flow has a direct effect on the Chinese economy.
The primary reason other countries buy Chinese goods is price. They are cheaper because of wage differentials. Should China lose that advantage to other nations or for other reasons, its ability to export would decline. Today, for example, as energy prices rise, the cost of production rises and the relative importance of the wage differential decreases. At a certain point, as China's trading partners see it, the value of Chinese imports relative to the political cost of closing down their factories will shift.
And all of this is outside of China's control. China cannot control the world price of oil. It can cut into its cash reserves to subsidize those prices for manufacturers but that would essentially be transferring money back to consuming nations. It can control rising wages by imposing price controls, but that would cause internal instability. The center of gravity of China is that it has become the industrial workshop of the world and, as such, it is totally dependent on the world to keep buying its goods rather than someone else's goods.
There are other issues for China, ranging from a dysfunctional financial system to farm land being taken out of production for factories. These are all significant and add to the story. But in geopolitics we look for the center of gravity, and for China the center of gravity is that the more effective it becomes at exporting, the more of a hostage it becomes to its customers. Some observers have warned that China might take its money out of American banks. Unlikely, but assume it did. What would China do without the United States as a customer?
China has placed itself in a position where it has to keep its customers happy. It struggles against this reality daily, but the fact is that the rest of the world is far less dependent on China's exports than China is dependent on the rest of the world.
Which brings us to the second, even more serious part of China's economic problem. The first geopolitical imperative of China is to ensure the unity of Han China. The third is to protect the coast. Deng's bet was that he could open the coast without disrupting the unity of Han China. As in the 19th century, the coastal region has become wealthy. The interior has remained extraordinarily poor. The coastal region is deeply enmeshed in the global economy. The interior is not. Beijing is once again balancing between the coast and the interior.
The interests of the coastal region and the interests of importers and investors are closely tied to each other. Beijing's interest is in maintaining internal stability. As pressures grow, it will seek to increase its control of the political and economic life of the coast. The interest of the interior is to have money transferred to it from the coast. The interest of the coast is to hold on to its money. Beijing will try to satisfy both, without letting China break apart and without resorting to Mao's draconian measures. But the worse the international economic situation becomes the less demand there will be for Chinese products and the less room there will be for China to maneuver.
The second part of the problem derives from the first. Assuming that the global economy does not decline now, it will at some point. When it does, and Chinese exports fall dramatically, Beijing will have to balance between an interior hungry for money and a coastal region that is hurting badly. It is important to remember that something like 900 million Chinese live in the interior while only about 400 million live in the coastal region. When it comes to balancing power, the interior is the physical threat to the regime while the coast destabilizes the distribution of wealth. The interior has mass on its side. The coast has the international trading system on its. Emperors have stumbled over less.
Conclusion
Geopolitics is based on geography and politics. Politics is built on two foundations: military and economic. The two interact and support each other but are ultimately distinct. For China, securing its buffer regions generally eliminates military problems. What problems are left for China are long-term issues concerning northeastern Manchuria and the balance of power in the Pacific.
China's geopolitical problem is economic. Its first geopolitical imperative, maintain the unity of Han China, and its third, protect the coast, are both more deeply affected by economic considerations than military ones. Its internal and external political problems flow from economics. The dramatic economic development of the last generation has been ruthlessly geographic. This development has benefited the coast and left the interior -- the vast majority of Chinese -- behind. It has also left China vulnerable to global economic forces that it cannot control and cannot accommodate. This is not new in Chinese history, but its usual resolution is in regionalism and the weakening of the central government. Deng's gamble is being played out by his successors. He dealt the hand. They have to play it.
The question on the table is whether the economic basis of China is a foundation or a balancing act. If the former, it can last a long time. If the latter, everyone falls down eventually. There appears to be little evidence that it is a foundation. It excludes most of the Chinese from the game, people who are making less than $100 a month. That is a balancing act and it threatens the first geopolitical imperative of China: protecting the unity of the Han Chinese.
Contemporary China is an island. Although it is not surrounded by water (which borders only its eastern flank), China is bordered by terrain that is difficult to traverse in virtually any direction. There are some areas that can be traversed, but to understand China we must begin by visualizing the mountains, jungles and wastelands that enclose it. This outer shell both contains and protects China.
Internally, China must be divided into two parts: The Chinese heartland and the non-Chinese buffer regions surrounding it. There is a line in China called the 15-inch isohyet. On the east side of this line more than 15 inches of rain fall each year. On the west side annual rainfall is less than that. The bulk of the Chinese population lives east and south of this line. This is Han China, the Chinese heartland. It is where the vast majority of Chinese live and the home of the ethnic Han, what the world regards as the Chinese. It is important to understand that over a billion people live in an area about half the size of the United States.
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The Chinese heartland is divided into two parts, northern and southern, which in turn is represented by two main dialects, Mandarin in the north and Cantonese in the south. These dialects share a writing system but are almost mutually incomprehensible when spoken. The Chinese heartland is defined by two major rivers -- the Yellow River in the north and the Yangtze in the South, along with a third lesser river in the south, the Pearl. The heartland is China's agricultural region. However -- and this is the single most important fact about China -- it has about one-third the arable land per person as the rest of the world. This pressure has defined modern Chinese history -- both in terms of living with it and trying to move beyond it.
A ring of non-Han regions surround this heartland -- Tibet, Xinjiang province (home of the Muslim Uighurs), Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. These are the buffer regions that historically have been under Chinese rule when China was strong and have broken away when China was weak. Today, there is a great deal of Han settlement in these regions, a cause of friction, but today Han China is strong.
These are also the regions where the historical threat to China originated. Han China is a region full of rivers and rain. It is therefore a land of farmers and merchants. The surrounding areas are the land of nomads and horsemen. In the 13th century, the Mongols under Ghenghis Khan invaded and occupied parts of Han China until the 15th century, when the Han reasserted their authority. Following this period, Chinese strategy remained constant: the slow and systematic assertion of control over these outer regions in order to protect the Han from incursions by nomadic cavalry. This imperative drove Chinese foreign policy. In spite of the imbalance of population, or perhaps because of it, China saw itself as extremely vulnerable to military forces moving from the north and west. Defending a massed population of farmers against these forces was difficult. The easiest solution, the one the Chinese chose, was to reverse the order and impose themselves on their potential conquerors.
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There was another reason. Aside from providing buffers, these possessions provided defensible borders. With borderlands under their control, China was strongly anchored. Let's consider the nature of China's border sequentially, starting in the east along the southern border with Vietnam and Myanmar. The border with Vietnam is the only border readily traversable by large armies or mass commerce. In fact, as recently as 1975, China and Vietnam fought a short border war, and there have been points in history when China has dominated Vietnam. However, the rest of the southern border where Yunnan province meets Laos and Myanmar is hilly jungle, difficult to traverse, with almost no major roads. Significant movement across this border is almost impossible. During World War II, the United States struggled to build the Burma Road to reach Yunnan and supply Chiang Kai-shek's forces. The effort was so difficult it became legendary. China is secure in this region.
Hkakabo Razi, almost 19,000 feet high, marks the border between China, Myanmar and India. At this point, China's southwestern frontier begins, anchored in the Himalayas. More precisely, it is where Tibet, controlled by China, borders India and the two Himalayan states, Nepal and Bhutan. This border runs in a long ark past Pakistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan, ending at Pik Pobedy, a 25,000-foot mountain marking the border with China, Kirgyzstan and Kazakhstan. It is possible to pass through this border region with difficulty; historically, parts of it have been accessible as a merchant route. On the whole, however, the Himalayas are a barrier to substantial trade and certainly to military forces. India and China -- and China and much of Central Asia -- are sealed off from each other.
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The one exception is the next section of the border, with Kazakhstan. This area is passable but has relatively little transport. As the transport expands, this will be the main route between China and the rest of Eurasia. It is the one land bridge from the Chinese island that can be used. The problem is distance. The border with Kazakhstan is almost a thousand miles from the first tier of Han Chinese provinces, and the route passes through sparsely populated Muslim territory, a region that has posed significant challenges to China. Importantly, the Silk Road from China ran through Xinjiang and Kazakhstan on its way west. It was the only way to go.
There is, finally, the long northern border first with Mongolia and then with Russia, running to the Pacific. This border is certainly passable. Indeed, the only successful invasion of China took place when Mongol horseman attacked from Mongolia, occupying a good deal of Han China. China's buffers -- Inner Mongolia and Manchuria -- have protected Han China from other attacks. The Chinese have not attacked northward for two reasons. First, there has historically not been much there worth taking. Second, north-south access is difficult. Russia has two rail lines running from the west to the Pacific -- the famous Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR) and the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM), which connects those two cities and ties into the TSR. Aside from that, there is no east-west ground transportation linking Russia. There is also no north-south transportation. What appears accessible really is not.
The area in Russia that is most accessible from China is the region bordering the Pacific, the area from Russia's Vladivostok to Blagoveschensk. This region has reasonable transport, population and advantages for both sides. If there were ever a conflict between China and Russia, this is the area that would be at the center of it. It is also the area, as you move southward and away from the Pacific, that borders on the Korean Peninsula, the area of China's last major military conflict.
Then there is the Pacific coast, which has numerous harbors and has historically had substantial coastal trade. It is interesting to note that, apart from the attempt by the Mongols to invade Japan, and a single major maritime thrust by China into the Indian Ocean -- primarily for trade and abandoned fairly quickly -- China has never been a maritime power. Prior to the 19th century, it had not faced enemies capable of posing a naval threat and, as a result, it had little interest in spending large sums of money on building a navy.
China, when it controls Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, is an insulated state. Han China has only one point of potential friction, in the southeast with Vietnam. Other than that it is surrounded by non-Han buffer regions that it has politically integrated into China. There is a second friction point in eastern Manchuria, touching on Siberia and Korea. There is, finally, a single opening into the rest of Eurasia on the Xinjiang-Kazakh border.
China's most vulnerable point, since the arrival of Europeans in the western Pacific in the mid-19th century, has been its coast. Apart from European encroachments in which commercial interests were backed up by limited force, China suffered its most significant military encounter -- and long and miserable war -- after the Japanese invaded and occupied large parts of eastern China along with Manchuria in the 1930s. Despite the mismatch in military power and more than a dozen years of war, Japan still could not force the Chinese government to capitulate. The simple fact was that Han China, given its size and population density, could not be subdued. No matter how many victories the Japanese won, they could not decisively defeat the Chinese.
China is hard to invade; given its size and population, it is even harder to occupy. This also makes it hard for the Chinese to invade others -- not utterly impossible, but quite difficult. Containing a fifth of the world's population, China can wall itself off from the world, as it did prior to the United Kingdom's forced entry in the 19th century and as it did under Mao Zedong. All of this means China is a great power, but one that has to behave very differently than other great powers.
China's Geopolitical Imperatives
China has three overriding geopolitical imperatives:
Maintain internal unity in the Han Chinese regions.
Maintain control of the buffer regions.
Protect the coast from foreign encroachment.
Maintaining Internal Unity
China is more enclosed than any other great power. The size of its population coupled with its secure frontiers and relative abundance of resources, allows it to develop with minimal intercourse with the rest of the world, if it chooses. During the Maoist period, for example, China became an insular nation, driven primarily by internal interests and considerations, indifferent or hostile to the rest of the world. It was secure and, except for its involvement in the Korean War and its efforts to pacify restless buffer regions, was relatively peaceful. Internally, however, China underwent periodic, self-generated chaos.
The weakness of insularity for China is poverty. Given the ratio of arable land to population, a self-enclosed China is a poor China. Its population is so poor that economic development driven by domestic demand, no matter how limited it might be, is impossible. However, an isolated China is easier to manage by a central government. The great danger in China is a rupture within the Han Chinese nation. If that happens, if the central government weakens, the peripheral regions will spin off, and China will then be vulnerable to foreigners taking advantage of Chinese weakness.
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For China to prosper, it has to engage in trade, exporting silk, silver and industrial products. Historically, land trade has not posed a problem for China. The Silk Road allowed foreign influences to come into China and the resulting wealth created a degree of instability. On the whole, however, it could be managed.
The dynamic of industrialism changed both the geography of Chinese trade and its consequences. In the mid-19th century, when Europe -- led by the British --compelled the Chinese government to give trading concessions to the British, it opened a new chapter in Chinese history. For the first time, the Pacific coast was the interface with the world, not Central Asia. This in turn, massively destabilized China.
As trade between China and the world intensified, the Chinese who were engaged in trading increased their wealth dramatically. Those in the coastal provinces of China, the region most deeply involved in trading, became relatively wealthy while the Chinese in the interior (not the buffer regions, which were always poor, but the non-coastal provinces of Han China) remained poor, subsistence farmers.
The central government was balanced between the divergent interests of coastal China and the interior. The coastal region, particularly its newly enriched leadership, had an interest in maintaining and intensifying relations with European powers and with the United States and Japan. The more intense the trade, the wealthier the coastal leadership and the greater the disparity between the regions. In due course, foreigners allied with Chinese coastal merchants and politicians became more powerful in the coastal regions than the central government. The worst geopolitical nightmare of China came true. China fragmented, breaking into regions, some increasingly under the control of foreigners, particularly foreign commercial interests. Beijing lost control over the country. It should be noted that this was the context in which Japan invaded China, which made Japan's failure to defeat China all the more extraordinary.
Mao's goal was three-fold, Marxism aside. First, he wanted to recentralize China -- re-establishing Beijing as China's capital and political center. Second, he wanted to end the massive inequality between the coastal region and the rest of China. Third, he wanted to expel the foreigners from China. In short, he wanted to recreate a united Han China.
Mao first attempted to trigger an uprising in the cities in 1927 but failed because the coalition of Chinese interests and foreign powers was impossible to break. Instead he took the long march to the interior of China, where he raised a massive peasant army that was both nationalist and egalitarian and, in 1948, returned to the coastal region and expelled the foreigners. Mao re-enclosed China, recentralized it, and accepted the inevitable result. China became equal but extraordinarily poor.
China's primary geopolitical issue is this: For it to develop it must engage in international trade. If it does that, it must use its coastal cities as an interface with the world. When that happens, the coastal cities and the surrounding region become increasingly wealthy. The influence of foreigners over this region increases and the interests of foreigners and the coastal Chinese converge and begin competing with the interests of the central government. China is constantly challenged by the problem of how to avoid this outcome while engaging in international trade.
Controlling the Buffer Regions
Prior to Mao's rise, with the central government weakened and Han China engaged simultaneously in war with Japan, civil war and regionalism, the center was not holding. While Manchuria was under Chinese control, Outer Mongolia was under Soviet control and extending its influence (Soviet power more than Marxist ideology) into Inner Mongolia, and Tibet and Xinjiang were drifting away.
At the same time that Mao was fighting the civil war, he was also laying the groundwork for taking control of the buffer regions. Interestingly, his first moves were designed to block Soviet interests in these regions. Mao moved to consolidate Chinese communist control over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, effectively leveraging the Soviets out. Xinjiang had been under the control of a regional war lord, Yang Zengxin. Shortly after the end of the civil war, Mao moved to force him out and take over Xinjiang. Finally, in 1950 Mao moved against Tibet, which he secured in 1951.
The rapid-fire consolidation of the buffer regions gave Mao what all Chinese emperors sought, a China secure from invasion. Controlling Tibet meant that India could not move across the Himalayas and establish a secure base of operations on the Tibetan Plateau. There could be skirmishes in the Himalayas, but no one could push a multi-divisional force across those mountains and keep it supplied. So long as Tibet was in Chinese hands, the Indians could live on the other side of the moon. Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria buffered China from the Soviet Union. Mao was more of a geopolitician than an ideologue. He did not trust the Soviets. With the buffer states in hand, they would not invade China. The distances, the poor transportation and the lack of resources meant that any Soviet invasion would run into massive logistical problems well before it reached Han China's populated regions, and become bogged down -- just as the Japanese had.
China had geopolitical issues with Vietnam, Pakistan and Afghanistan, neighboring states with which it shared a border, but the real problem for China would come in Manchuria or, more precisely, Korea. The Soviets, more than the Chinese, had encouraged a North Korean invasion of South Korea. It is difficult to speculate on Joseph Stalin's thinking, but it worked out superbly for him. The United States intervened, defeated the North Korean Army and drove to the Yalu, the river border with China. The Chinese, seeing the well-armed and well-trained American force surge to its borders, decided that it had to block its advance and attacked south. What resulted was three years of brutal warfare in which the Chinese lost about a million men. From the Soviet point of view, fighting between China and the United States was the best thing imaginable. But from Stratfor's point of view, what it demonstrated was the sensitivity of the Chinese to any encroachment on their borderlands, their buffers, which represent the foundation of their national security.
Protecting the Coast
With the buffer regions under control, the coast is China's most vulnerable point, but its vulnerability is not to invasion. Given the Japanese example, no one has the interest or forces to try to invade mainland China, supply an army there and hope to win. Invasion is not a meaningful threat.
The coastal threat to China is economic, and most would not call it a threat. As we saw, the British intrusion into China culminated in the destabilization of the country, the virtual collapse of the central government and civil war. It was all caused by prosperity. Mao had solved the problem by sealing the coast of China off to any real development and liquidating the class that had collaborated with foreign business. For Mao, xenophobia was integral to natural policy. He saw foreign presence as undermining the stability of China. He preferred impoverished unity to chaos. He also understood that, given China's population and geography, it could defend itself against potential attackers without an advanced military-industrial complex.
His successor, Deng Xiaoping, was heir to a powerful state in control of China and the buffer regions. He also felt under tremendous pressure politically to improve living standards, and he undoubtedly understood that technological gaps would eventually threaten Chinese national security. He took a historic gamble. He knew that China's economy could not develop on its own. China's internal demand for goods was too weak because the Chinese were too poor.
Deng gambled that he could open China to foreign investment and reorient the Chinese economy away from agriculture and heavy industry and toward export-oriented industries. By doing so he would increase living standards, import technology and train China's workforce. He was betting that the effort this time would not destabilize China, create massive tensions between the prosperous coastal provinces and the interior, foster regionalism or put the coastal regions under foreign control. Deng believed he could avoid all that by maintaining a strong central government, based on a loyal army and communist party apparatus. His successors have struggled to maintain that loyalty to the state and not to foreign investors, who can make individuals wealthy. That is the bet that is currently being played out.
China's Geopolitics and its Current Position
From a political and military standpoint, China has achieved its strategic goals. The buffer regions are intact and China faces no threat in Eurasia. It sees a Western attempt to force China out of Tibet as an attempt to undermine Chinese national security. For China, however, Tibet is a minor irritant; China has no possible intention of leaving Tibet, the Tibetans cannot rise up and win, and no one is about to invade the region. Similarly, the Uighur Muslims represent an irritant in Xinjiang and not a direct threat. The Russians have no interest in or capability of invading China, and the Korean peninsula does not represent a direct threat to the Chinese, certainly not one they could not handle.
The greatest military threat to China comes from the United States Navy. The Chinese have become highly dependent on seaborne trade and the United States Navy is in a position to blockade China's ports if it wished. Should the United States do that, it would cripple China. Therefore, China's primary military interest is to make such a blockade impossible.
It would take several generations for China to build a surface navy able to compete with the United States Navy. Simply training naval aviators to conduct carrier-based operations effectively would take decades -- at least until these trainees became admirals and captains. And this does not take into account the time it would take to build an aircraft carrier and carrier-capable aircraft and master the intricacies of carrier operations.
For China, the primary mission is to raise the price of a blockade so high that the Americans would not attempt it. The means for that would be land- and submarine-based-anti-ship missiles. The strategic solution is for China to construct a missile force sufficiently dispersed that it cannot be suppressed by the United States and with sufficient range to engage the United States at substantial distance, as far as the central Pacific.
In order for this missile force to be effective, it would have to be able to identify and track potential targets. Therefore, if the Chinese are to pursue this strategy, they must also develop a space-based maritime reconnaissance system. These are the technologies that the Chinese are focusing on. Anti-ship missiles and space-based systems, including anti-satellite systems designed to blind the Americans, represent China's military counter to its only significant military threat.
China could also use those missiles to blockade Taiwan by interdicting ships going to and from the island. But the Chinese do not have the naval ability to land a sufficient amphibious force and sustain it in ground combat. Nor do they have the ability to establish air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. China might be able to harass Taiwan but it will not invade it. Missiles, satellites and submarines constitute China's naval strategy.
For China, the primary problem posed by Taiwan is naval. Taiwan is positioned in such a way that it can readily serve as an air and naval base that could isolate maritime movement between the South China Sea and the East China Sea, effectively leaving the northern Chinese coast and Shanghai isolated. When you consider the Ryukyu Islands that stretch from Taiwan to Japan and add them to this mix, a non-naval power could blockade the northern Chinese coast if it held Taiwan.
Taiwan would not be important to China unless it became actively hostile or allied with or occupied by a hostile power such as the United States. If that happened, its geographical position would pose an extremely serious problem for China. Taiwan is also an important symbolic issue to China and a way to rally nationalism. Although Taiwan presents no immediate threat, it does pose potential dangers that China cannot ignore.
There is one area in which China is being modestly expansionist -- Central Asia and particularly Kazakhstan. Traditionally a route for trading silk, Kazakhstan is now an area that can produce energy, badly needed by China's industry. The Chinese have been active in developing commercial relations with Kazakhstan and in developing roads into Kazakhstan. These roads are opening a trading route that allows oil to flow in one direction and industrial goods in another.
In doing this, the Chinese are challenging Russia's sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. The Russians have been prepared to tolerate increased Chinese economic activity in the region while being wary of China's turning into a political power. Kazakhstan has been European Russia's historical buffer state against Chinese expansion and it has been under Russian domination. This region must be watched carefully. If Russia begins to feel that China is becoming too assertive in this region, it could respond militarily to Chinese economic power.
Chinese-Russian relations have historically been complex. Before World War II, the Soviets attempt to manipulate Chinese politics. After World War II, relations between the Soviet Union and China were never as good as some thought, and sometimes these relations became directly hostile, as in 1968, when Russian and Chinese troops fought a battle along the Ussuri River. The Russians have historically feared a Chinese move into their Pacific maritime provinces. The Chinese have feared a Russian move into Manchuria and beyond.
Neither of these things happened because the logistical challenges involved were enormous and neither had an appetite for the risk of fighting the other. We would think that this caution will prevail under current circumstances. However, growing Chinese influence in Kazakhstan is not a minor matter for the Russians, who may choose to contest China there. If they do, and it becomes a serious matter, the secondary pressure point for both sides would be in the Pacific region, complicated by proximity to Korea.
But these are only theoretical possibilities. The threat of an American blockade on China's coast, of using Taiwan to isolate northern China, of conflict over Kazakhstan -- all are possibilities that the Chinese must take into account as they plan for the worst. In fact, the United States does not have an interest in blockading China and the Chinese and Soviets are not going to escalate competition over Kazakhstan.
China does not have a military-based geopolitical problem. It is in its traditional strong position, physically secure as it holds its buffer regions. It has achieved it three strategic imperatives. What is most vulnerable at this point is its first imperative: the unity of Han China. That is not threatened militarily. Rather, the threat to that is economic.
Economic Dimensions of Chinese Geopolitics
The problem of China, rooted in geopolitics, is economic and it presents itself in two ways. The first is simple. China has an export-oriented economy. It is in a position of dependency. No matter how large its currency reserves or how advanced its technology or how cheap its labor force, China depends on the willingness and ability of other countries to import its goods -- as well as the ability to physically ship them. Any disruption of this flow has a direct effect on the Chinese economy.
The primary reason other countries buy Chinese goods is price. They are cheaper because of wage differentials. Should China lose that advantage to other nations or for other reasons, its ability to export would decline. Today, for example, as energy prices rise, the cost of production rises and the relative importance of the wage differential decreases. At a certain point, as China's trading partners see it, the value of Chinese imports relative to the political cost of closing down their factories will shift.
And all of this is outside of China's control. China cannot control the world price of oil. It can cut into its cash reserves to subsidize those prices for manufacturers but that would essentially be transferring money back to consuming nations. It can control rising wages by imposing price controls, but that would cause internal instability. The center of gravity of China is that it has become the industrial workshop of the world and, as such, it is totally dependent on the world to keep buying its goods rather than someone else's goods.
There are other issues for China, ranging from a dysfunctional financial system to farm land being taken out of production for factories. These are all significant and add to the story. But in geopolitics we look for the center of gravity, and for China the center of gravity is that the more effective it becomes at exporting, the more of a hostage it becomes to its customers. Some observers have warned that China might take its money out of American banks. Unlikely, but assume it did. What would China do without the United States as a customer?
China has placed itself in a position where it has to keep its customers happy. It struggles against this reality daily, but the fact is that the rest of the world is far less dependent on China's exports than China is dependent on the rest of the world.
Which brings us to the second, even more serious part of China's economic problem. The first geopolitical imperative of China is to ensure the unity of Han China. The third is to protect the coast. Deng's bet was that he could open the coast without disrupting the unity of Han China. As in the 19th century, the coastal region has become wealthy. The interior has remained extraordinarily poor. The coastal region is deeply enmeshed in the global economy. The interior is not. Beijing is once again balancing between the coast and the interior.
The interests of the coastal region and the interests of importers and investors are closely tied to each other. Beijing's interest is in maintaining internal stability. As pressures grow, it will seek to increase its control of the political and economic life of the coast. The interest of the interior is to have money transferred to it from the coast. The interest of the coast is to hold on to its money. Beijing will try to satisfy both, without letting China break apart and without resorting to Mao's draconian measures. But the worse the international economic situation becomes the less demand there will be for Chinese products and the less room there will be for China to maneuver.
The second part of the problem derives from the first. Assuming that the global economy does not decline now, it will at some point. When it does, and Chinese exports fall dramatically, Beijing will have to balance between an interior hungry for money and a coastal region that is hurting badly. It is important to remember that something like 900 million Chinese live in the interior while only about 400 million live in the coastal region. When it comes to balancing power, the interior is the physical threat to the regime while the coast destabilizes the distribution of wealth. The interior has mass on its side. The coast has the international trading system on its. Emperors have stumbled over less.
Conclusion
Geopolitics is based on geography and politics. Politics is built on two foundations: military and economic. The two interact and support each other but are ultimately distinct. For China, securing its buffer regions generally eliminates military problems. What problems are left for China are long-term issues concerning northeastern Manchuria and the balance of power in the Pacific.
China's geopolitical problem is economic. Its first geopolitical imperative, maintain the unity of Han China, and its third, protect the coast, are both more deeply affected by economic considerations than military ones. Its internal and external political problems flow from economics. The dramatic economic development of the last generation has been ruthlessly geographic. This development has benefited the coast and left the interior -- the vast majority of Chinese -- behind. It has also left China vulnerable to global economic forces that it cannot control and cannot accommodate. This is not new in Chinese history, but its usual resolution is in regionalism and the weakening of the central government. Deng's gamble is being played out by his successors. He dealt the hand. They have to play it.
The question on the table is whether the economic basis of China is a foundation or a balancing act. If the former, it can last a long time. If the latter, everyone falls down eventually. There appears to be little evidence that it is a foundation. It excludes most of the Chinese from the game, people who are making less than $100 a month. That is a balancing act and it threatens the first geopolitical imperative of China: protecting the unity of the Han Chinese.
Re: THE GEOPOLITICS OF CHINA: A Great Power Enclosed
Nov 22nd, '11, 07:15
被封閉的巨大力量: 美學者眼中的中國地緣政治
譯︰智威/簡介
窺本文知中國地緣政治全貌。作者通過軍事和經濟兩方面的分析，指出中國以出口導向的政策所蘊含的巨大危險。反觀不少中國學者大力提倡“金融危機是中國崛起的歷史機遇”實屬妖言惑眾。中國人需要更加現實。掃平貪官污吏，將收繳的巨額財富轉變為社會保障基金。改變政府與民爭利的現狀，再談霸權也為時未晚。當前關于國富民窮的議論不絕于耳，相信政府不可能不知道。本文可以提供了解這一現狀的一條思路。
無論我身處世界哪個地方，在南非、歐洲或者和拉荷亞，我總會被問到同一個問題“中國怎麼樣？”以及隨之而來的輕輕的驚嘆。過去中國所積聚的影響力，正在搖搖晃晃的日益增速。在石油、礦石、耕地、股票或者債券市場，你必須和中國政府領導的擁有一萬億美元基金的機構競價。在這些市場，中國逐步成為最重要的參與者。底線︰無論你是否正在充滿氣罐還是交易信用違約互換，中國的決定影響著你的袖珍寶典。
最清楚不過的事情是，在基本情況不會改變的時候必須看到中國的長期需求。我的朋友George Friedman和他在斯坦福德的團隊是這方面的行家里手。他們的地緣政治研究並不在意流行的觀點，而是集中發現國家政策背後的真實驅動力。這對中國市場來說特別重要，因為傳統的財務狀況分析是不可能的，利潤動機也不適用。
星期一，George和他的團隊將發布他們的地緣政治研究專著系列的第二篇——中國的地緣政治。我已經收到這份報告的副本，這將是我們雜志的特別版。你知道中國是個孤島嗎？想知道他們國家財富之後的戰略嗎？對西藏和達爾富爾的政策？加入Stratfor吧。你可以得到一整年的Stratfor的洞見，加上關于中國的地緣政治和其他地緣政治專著。
下面這張地圖顯示中國如何是孤島。太迷人了。這不過是George用以說明中國如何組成的諸多地圖中的一張。我希望你發現這報告多麼有趣。
編輯 John Mauldin
被封閉的巨大力量: 美學者眼中的中國地緣政治(組圖)
中國是個島國
中國的地緣政治︰被封閉的巨大力量
當代中國是個島國。盡管並非被水包圍（只有東側是海洋），中國周邊的地勢使它從任何方向都很難接近，只有少數地方能夠進入中國。不過為了了解這個國家，我們必須從那些包圍它的山區，叢林和荒地開始。這些堅固外殼包容了並保護著中國。
中國內部可以分為兩個部分︰核心腹地和圍繞著的緩沖區域。中國有一條15寸的等雨量線。在這條線的東部年降雨量大于15寸，西部則小于15寸。大批中國人居住在這條線的東部和南部。這即是中國的核心腹地，大多數中國人生活的地方，漢族人的家。這有助于了解為什麼超過十億的中國人住在只有美國一半面積的地方。
這片腹地分成南北兩部分，並形成了兩種主要的方言，北方的普通話和南方的廣東話。兩種方言的書寫方式是相同的，但是談話時幾乎無法相互了解。這片地區有兩條主要的河流，北方的黃河和南方的長江，還有一條長度排在第三位的南方的珠江。這里是中國的農業地區，然而有關于中國的最重要的因素是，人均耕地面積只有世界水平的三分之一。這種壓力造就了近代中國歷史——必須在這里生活，又試圖超越這片土地。
一圈少數民族地區圍繞著腹地——西藏、新疆（維吾爾穆斯林的故鄉）、內蒙古和滿洲。歷史上，這些緩沖地區在中國強盛時被統治，衰弱時則脫離。今天，大量的漢族人安置在這些區域。這是矛盾的一個原因，不過今日漢族人已經足夠強大了。
這些區域在中國古代構成了威脅。漢族中國富含江河雨水，農民和商人較多，而環繞著多是游牧民族。13世紀，成吉思汗率領蒙古侵略並佔據了漢族中國的一部分。直到15世紀，漢族才重新奪回了主權。這個時期之後，中國人的策略保持著一致︰緩慢系統的維護對外部區域的統治以防遭受到游牧騎兵的攻擊。這種規則改變了中國的對外政策。
還有另一個原因。除了提供緩沖之外，這些領地還可以提供防御邊界。有了這片邊界地區，中國就可以高枕無憂。讓我們按照順序看看中國邊界的本質，從東邊沿著南部的越南和緬甸邊界開始。越南邊界是能夠通過大型軍隊和進行大量貿易的唯一邊境。實際上，不久前的1975年，中國和越南進行過一場短暫的邊境戰爭。這里的某些地域在歷史上是中國控制著越南的。然而，南部邊境的其他地方，雲南和老撾緬甸交界處，是難以穿越的丘陵叢林，幾乎沒有道路。大張旗鼓的通過這里是不可能的。第二次世界大戰時，美國試圖建設緬甸公路到達雲南以支援蔣介石。這辦法太困難無法實現。中國在這片區域是安全的。
被封閉的巨大力量: 美學者眼中的中國地緣政治(組圖)
中國的省份
開卡博峰，海撥將近19000英尺，是中國，緬甸和印度的分界。中國的西南邊境從這里開始，背靠著喜馬拉雅山脈。準確來說，中國統治下的西藏是印度和兩個喜馬拉雅山脈國家尼泊爾和不丹的分界線。這條長長的弧線經過巴基斯坦、塔吉克斯坦和吉爾吉斯斯坦，結束于25000英尺海撥的勝利峰。這座巨大山峰是中國、吉爾吉斯斯坦和哈薩克斯坦的分界。這條邊境線能夠通行，不過有點費勁。在歷史上，商隊曾經穿行過部分地區。總體來說，喜馬拉雅山脈阻擋了商貿活動和軍隊入侵。印度和中國，還有中國和大部分中亞地區是彼此隔絕的。
唯一例外的是分界線的下一個區域哈薩克斯坦。這片地區可以通行，但是交通並不發達。經過開發，這里將會變成中國和歐亞大陸之間的主要通道。這段大陸橋中國是可以利用的。問題在于距離。哈薩克斯坦的邊境距離漢族中國的最近的省市也有大概幾千英里那麼遠。而且必須通過人口稀疏的穆斯林領地。這片領地已經表現出挑戰中國的姿態。很重要的是，絲綢之路曾經經過新疆和西面的哈薩克斯坦，這是唯一的通路。
被封閉的巨大力量: 美學者眼中的中國地緣政治(組圖)
中國的地貌
最後，漫長的北方邊境先是和蒙古接壤，然後是俄羅斯，直到太平洋。這段邊境絕對可以通行。其實，中國歷史上發生過一次成功的入侵。當時從蒙古來的游牧騎兵佔領了漢族中國的大部分土地。中國的內蒙古和滿洲作為緩沖地帶保護了漢族中國免受其他攻擊。中國人沒有向北方侵略有兩個原因。第一，歷史上，那邊沒有什麼有價值的東西。第二，南北交通很困難。俄羅斯有兩條鐵路線橫貫西部和太平洋——著名的西伯利亞鐵路和貝加爾湖-阿穆爾河主干線。後者連接著這兩個地區並聯通了西伯利亞鐵路。除此之外，沒有東西向交通方式。也沒有南北向交通方式。確實沒有其他辦法。
從海參崴到布拉果阜司欽斯克的太平洋一帶的俄羅斯邊境是最有可能進入中國的地區。這片區域具備合理的交通條件，人口和相互的其他優勢。如果中國和俄羅斯曾經有過爭端，那麼這個地區將成為中心。如果你從這里向南移動，離開太平洋，將會到達朝鮮半島。中國上次的軍事爭端就發生在這里。
接下來是太平洋海岸。這里有無數的海港，歷史上發生過大量的海洋貿易。很有意思的是，除了蒙古企圖進攻日本之外，中國最主要的海上活動僅僅是為了貿易而進入印度洋，卻被很快放棄了。中國從未成為海上霸權。直到19世紀，沒有出現過強大的海上艦隊威脅中國，所以中國也沒有興趣興師動眾建設海軍。
中國控制了西藏、新疆、內蒙古和滿洲後變成了一個被隔絕的國家。漢族中國只有在東南地區同越南有沖突的可能性。除此之外，周圍的少數民族緩沖地區已經在政治上歸屬中國。第二個沖突地區是東部的滿洲，涉及到西伯利亞和朝鮮。最後是新疆-哈薩克邊境的連接歐亞大陸的開放通路。
自從19世紀中葉西太平洋的歐洲人到達之後，中國最薄弱的地方即是海岸地區。歐洲人以有限的武力為後盾，為著商業的目的侵犯中國後，這場長久而屈辱的戰爭是中國所遭遇的最重大的軍事攻擊。後來，日本人侵略中國，佔據了中國東部的大部分地區，包括在1930年佔據滿洲。盡管軍事力量懸殊，經過多年戰爭，日本仍然無法迫使中國政府投降。漢族中國因著廣闊的面積和密集的人口，是不會輕易屈服的，這是個簡單的事實。無論日本人取得多少勝利，他們仍然無法決定性的擊敗中國。
被封閉的巨大力量: 美學者眼中的中國地緣政治(組圖)
中國的族群語言學發布
中國是難以侵犯的，憑著它的面積和人口，更難以佔據。這也使中國不容易侵犯其他國家——不是絕對不可能，而是相當困難。擁有全世界五分之一的人口，中國能夠與世界隔絕，就像是19世紀英國武力進入之前和毛澤東統治下的那種狀況。這些都表明中國是一種強大的力量，但是和其他強大力量所表現出來的方式不一樣。
中國地緣政治規則
中國有三個壓倒性的地緣政治規則
1在漢族中國地區保持內部統一。
2保持對緩沖地區的控制。
3保護海岸防止外國侵犯。
保持內部統一
中國比其他強大力量更加封閉。中國的人口數量結合著安全的邊境和豐富的自然資源允許它在發展過程中與世界僅需要極少的交流。比如，毛澤東時代，中國成為主要是內部利益驅動的孤島國家，對世界表現出冷漠或者敵意。除去它被卷入朝鮮戰爭以及平定動蕩的緩沖地區，可以說是安全且相對和平的。然而中國內部經歷了周期性的自發產生的混亂。
中國孤島狀態的弱點是貧窮。從人均耕地面積來看，這個封閉的國家是個窮國。人民如此貧窮致使由國內需求帶動經濟發展是不可能的。然而，孤立的國家是很容易被中央政府管理的。中國最大的危險是漢族中國人內部不和。如果這個問題發生了，如果中央政府不夠強大，那些附屬地區將會脫離，中國面對外敵會變得十分脆弱。
中國走向繁榮昌盛必須參與貿易，出口絲綢，銀器和工業產品。歷史上，陸路貿易並未給中國帶來麻煩。絲綢之路允許外國勢力進入中國，隨之產生的財富造成了一定程度的不穩定。但是整體上是能夠被管理的。
工業化的動力改變了中國貿易的地理和它的進程。19世紀中葉，英國率領下的歐洲強迫中國政府開放貿易，由此揭開了中國歷史的新一頁。第一次，太平洋海岸而不是中亞成為世界的連接界面。這極大地動搖了中國。
中國和世界的貿易日益加強後，從事貿易的中國人突然獲得了財富。那些沿海地區的省份，貿易開展的深入的地區，變得相對富裕。而內陸地區（不是指始終貧苦的緩沖地區而是指漢族中國的不靠海岸的省份）仍舊貧窮，有大批為生存而忙碌的農民。
中央政府在平衡沿海和內陸地區的南轅北轍的利益需求。沿海地區，特別是一群富裕的領導階層，希望能夠保持並加強與歐洲，美國和日本的關系。貿易越是緊密，沿海地區的領導階層越是富裕，地區間的貧富懸殊越大。等到某個時候，那些與商人和政治人士有著密切關系的外國人就越來越握有權力，直到超過中央政府對沿海地區的影響力。這種最壞的地緣政治的噩夢變為事實。中國分裂成多個地區，其中一些很快被外國人特別是外國商業利益所統領。北京失去了對國家的控制。必須提醒大家注意，這是日本侵略卻極為奇怪的無法打敗中國的上下文。
毛澤東有三個目標，馬克思主義暫且不談。第一，他想重新統一中國——重新將北京作為中國的首都和政治中心。第二，他想結束沿海地區和其他地區的不平等。第三，他想將外國人驅逐出中國。簡單說，他希望重建一個統一的漢族中國。
毛最初在1927年發動城市武裝起義，後來失敗了。企圖打破中國權貴和外國勢力的聯盟是不可能的。經過長征，他來到中國內地，在這里召集了兼有國家主義和平等主義的大規模農民軍隊。1948年，他回到了沿海地區並驅逐了外國人。毛重新封閉了中國，實行中央集權，接受了必然的現實。中國變成了平等卻非常貧困的國家。
被封閉的巨大力量: 美學者眼中的中國地緣政治(組圖)
中國的人口密度分布
中國最主要的地緣政治的問題在于︰如果要發展，就必須從事國際貿易。而這樣做，又必須使沿海城市成為對外接口。如此沿海城市和附近地區很快富裕起來。外國人對這片區域的影響力增加了。進而外國勢力與沿海的中國人聯合起來開始對抗中央政府的利益。怎樣既參與國際貿易中又避免上述結果是中國始終面臨的挑戰。
控制緩沖地區
在毛升起之前，中央政府力量薄弱，漢族中國始終卷入抗擊日本，解放戰爭和地區分裂之中。盡管滿洲在中國人控制中，甦聯卻控制了外蒙古並將影響力延伸到內蒙古（甦聯的軍事實力遠勝于馬克思意識形態），西藏和新疆漂泊不定。
毛在進行解放戰爭的同時也在為控制緩沖地區奠定基礎。有趣的是，他的第一個動作就是封鎖甦聯在上述地區的利益。毛鞏固了中國共產黨對滿洲和內蒙古的控制，有效地令甦聯出局。新疆在地方武裝首領楊增新的統治下。解放戰爭結束不久，毛就趕走了他，接管了新疆。最後，1950年，毛開始對付西藏。1951年解放西藏。
對緩沖地區的迅速鞏固使毛擁有了免受侵犯的安全國家，這是中國歷代帝王所追求的。控制西藏意味著印度無法穿過喜馬拉雅山脈在西藏高原生根。喜馬拉雅山脈可能發生小規模戰爭，但是沒有人能夠令多種部隊越過高山而且補充供給。只要西藏屬于中國，印度人只能老老實實呆在大山的另一邊。新疆，內蒙古和滿洲是中國和甦聯的緩沖帶。毛是地緣政治家而不是空想主義者，他並不相信甦維埃。面對這些緩沖區，他們無法進攻中國。距離，惡劣的交通，匱乏的資源意味著，如果甦聯進犯中國，在到達漢族中國人口稠密區之前就落入巨大的後勤問題中，只能被迫停頓下來，就像從前的日本那樣。
中國與鄰國越南、巴基斯坦和阿富汗有過小摩擦。但是真正有問題的是滿洲，確切的說是朝鮮。甦維埃政權比起中國人來，更加支持北朝鮮入侵南朝鮮。很難推測約瑟夫‧斯大林當時的想法，但是這想法明顯起作用了。美國人插手進來，擊潰了北朝鮮軍隊，到達了中國邊境鴨綠江。中國人看到肩負先進武器，受過良好訓練的美國軍隊涌入邊界地區，決定阻止他們前進，並予以回擊。三年的殘酷戰爭使中國死傷一百多萬人。從甦維埃政府的角度看，中國和美國之間的戰爭對他們是很有好處的。但是Stratfor的觀點認為，這場戰爭證明中國人對待邊疆地區或者說緩沖地區的侵犯是非常敏感的，因為這是國家安全的基礎。
保護海岸
緩沖地帶嚴密控制之後，沿海成為中國最薄弱的地方，但是並非因為容易侵犯而薄弱。回顧日本侵華的歷史，沒有人會有興趣和實力進犯中國大陸，進行軍隊供給，還希望能夠贏得戰爭。侵略毫無意義。
對中國沿海的威脅是經濟因素，不過似乎也不能稱為威脅。我們已經看到，英國闖入中國最終完結在國家動蕩，中央政府轟然倒塌和內戰之中，而這一切都是經濟繁榮導致的。毛通過閉關鎖國和肅清與外國商人勾結的階級分子解決了這個問題。對毛來說，不願與外國往來是很自然的政策。他認為外國的存在對中國的穩定具有流水沖刷侵蝕底部那般危險。比起混亂，他更喜歡貧困的和諧。他也明白，憑著中國的人口和地理，沒有先進的軍事-工業組合，中國人也足以保護自己免受潛在的攻擊。
他的繼任者鄧小平繼承了能夠控制中國和緩沖地區的強大政府。他感覺到來自改善民生的巨大政治壓力。他心知肚明科技的差距最終會威脅到國家安全。為此他賭下歷史籌碼。中國太貧窮了，內部需求無法帶動經濟發展的現狀他太清楚了。
鄧認為中國能夠向外國資本開放，將中國經濟從農業和重工業重新定位在出口導向產業。這樣做能夠改善人民生活水平，進口技術，培訓中國勞動力。鄧打賭這次將不會導致中國動亂，造成富裕的沿海省份和內地之間的緊張形式，培植地區分割或者置沿海地區在外國統治之下。鄧相信，依靠忠實的軍隊和共產黨組織，維持強大的中央政府就可以避免這些不利局面。鄧的繼任者仍然想辦法維持著這種對政府的忠誠，而不是對制造個人財富的外國投資者的忠誠。這就是一直在玩的賭注。
中國的地緣政治和當前狀況
從政治和軍事的角度看，中國已經達到了戰略目標。緩沖區域是完整的，中國也沒有面臨歐亞方向的威脅。我們能看到西方國家企圖迫使西藏分立以達到陰謀破壞中國安全的目的。不過對中國來說，西藏只是小小的騷擾。中國不可能讓西藏獨立。藏族人無法勝利起義，也沒有人打算侵佔這個地方。同樣的，維吾爾穆斯林也只是對新疆的騷擾而不構成直接的威脅。俄羅斯沒有興趣或者能力進犯中國。朝鮮半島也不能構成直接的威脅。
對中國最大的軍事威脅來自美國海軍。中國變得日益高度依賴海上貿易，而美國根據自已的意願處于能夠封鎖中國港口的地位。如果美國人這麼做了，那將使中國變成殘廢。因此，中國最重要的軍事注意力是使這種封鎖不可能發生。
中國需要幾代人的時間才能建設一支足以對抗美國海軍的海面部隊。僅僅是訓練海軍飛行員有效地實施航空母艦的操作就要花掉幾十年的時間——至少要等到這些受訓者成為艦隊司令和船長。這還沒有考慮到建造航空母艦和適應航空母艦的飛機以及掌握錯綜復雜的航空母艦操作的必須時間。
中國最重要的任務就是加大封鎖的代價致使美國人不再有這種企圖。這是指陸地和潛水艇反艦艇導彈。這種戰略方案是構造一個足夠分散的導彈系統，它本身無法被美國破壞，能夠在足夠的範圍內超長距離攻擊美國，甚至遠至太平洋中心。
這套導彈系統能夠有效就必須擁有分辨和追蹤潛在目標的能力。因此，如果中國人實行這種戰略，他們必須發展空間基礎的海洋偵測系統。這正是中國特別重視的技術。反艦艇導彈和空間基礎系統包括令美國“目盲”的反衛星系統，這些是中國面臨唯一重大的軍事威脅的籌碼。
中國同樣能夠利用這套導彈系統阻止船只進入和離開台灣以實現對其封鎖。但是中國還不具備海上能力使足夠的海軍陸軍登陸並且支持陸地戰斗。而且也沒有能力建立空中優勢越過台灣海峽。中國或許可以折磨台灣但是無法侵佔它。導彈、衛星和潛水艇組成了中國海軍戰略。
台灣給中國造成的主要問題在海洋上。台灣的位置是這樣的，它可以作為海軍和空軍基地阻隔中國南海和東海之間的海上活動，有效地使中國北部海岸和上海被隔離了。當你考慮到琉球列島，這片從台灣向日本拉伸的區域，你會發現只要控制了台灣，不需要海軍力量即可以控制中國北部。
台灣平時對中國來說並不重要，除非它主動產生了敵意，或者和美國這樣的敵對勢力聯合起來甚至被美國佔據。如果這些事情發生，它的地緣政治的位置將給中國造成特別嚴重的問題。台灣也是一個重要的符號象征，是中國重新聚集民族主義的一條途徑。盡管台灣不代表當前的威脅，但是中國不能忽視潛在危險。
中國正在一個區域充當謹慎的擴張者角色——中亞特別是哈薩克斯坦。傳統上這里是絲綢之路的通道。哈薩克斯坦現在處于富含能源的地區，而這是中國工業所急需的。中國人已經主動和哈薩克斯坦建立了商業關系，正在修建通向哈薩克斯坦的道路。這些道路打開了貿易通道，使石油流向這邊而工業產品流向那邊。
中國正在前甦聯地區挑戰俄羅斯的勢力範圍。俄羅斯人容忍了中國快速增長的經濟活動，同時謹慎關注中國轉變為政治霸權。歷史上，哈薩克斯坦是歐洲的俄羅斯阻止中國擴張的緩沖國家，曾經處于俄羅斯統領之下。這個地區必須被嚴密監視。如果俄羅斯開始感到中國在這里地區日益武斷，它將以軍事力量回擊中國的經濟霸權。
中國與俄羅斯的關系在歷史上是很復雜的。第二次世界大戰之前，甦維埃政權企圖操縱中國政治。大戰之後，甦聯和中國的關系從未向某些人所設想的那麼友好。有時這些關系變得直接敵視，比如1968年。當時俄羅斯軍隊和中國軍隊在烏甦里河一帶作戰。俄羅斯人一直擔心中國人進入他們的太平洋地區。中國人擔心俄羅斯人進入滿洲及後方。
因為巨大的後勤成本，兩者不會發生戰爭；他們也沒有彼此進攻的欲望。在當前環境下，謹慎是佔上風的。然而，中國在哈薩克斯坦逐日增加的影響對俄羅斯不是個小問題。他們可能在這里和中國競爭。如果他們這樣做了，這一切將變成嚴重問題。太平洋地區也可能會爆發矛盾，因為毗鄰朝鮮而有些復雜。
這一切都只是理論上的可能性。美國人封鎖中國海岸，利用台灣隔離中國北部，在哈薩克斯坦的對抗——這些可能性中國必須作為最壞的打算考慮進去。實際上，美國並沒有興趣封鎖中國，中國和俄羅斯也不打算為哈薩克斯坦升級競賽。
中國不存在軍事方面的地緣政治問題。只要控制好緩沖區域，它就可以繼承古代的堅固位置，保證安全地位。中國已經實現上述三個戰略性的規則。最薄弱的反而是第一個規則︰漢族中國的統一。這種威脅並非來自軍事，而是來自經濟。
中國地緣政治的經濟狀況
中國來源于地緣政治的問題是關于經濟的，有兩個方面。第一個方面很簡單。中國經濟是出口導向的，因此無法獨立。不管貨幣儲存量多大，技術多麼先進以及勞動力多麼便宜，中國必須依靠其他國家進口商品的意願和能力，還有運輸條件。任何貿易干擾都將直接影響中國經濟。
外國購買中國商品的最重要的原因是價格便宜。產品便宜是由于工資差異。一旦中國失去了這個比較優勢，出口能力即大為削弱。還有其他原因，比如，當前能源價格上漲，產品成本隨之上漲，工資差異的相關重要性即降低了。這種情況到達某個臨界點，中國的貿易伙伴就會衡量進口中國產品的價值還是關閉工廠的政治成本孰高孰低了。
這些都不是中國所能控制的。中國無法控制世界石油價格。它可以利用現金儲備補助工廠的生產成本，但是本質上這不過是把錢送還給消費這些產品的國家。它可以強行價格管制以控制增長的工資，但是這將導致國家內部失衡。中國的核心問題是它已經變成世界工廠，它完全依靠全世界都來選購商品，而不是到其他國家購買。
中國還有其他問題，從不健全的財政制度到被工廠佔用的耕地。但是我們所看到中國的在地緣政治方面的核心問題是︰中國在出口方面越有成效，就越變成它的顧客的人質。一些觀察家已經警告過中國可能從美國銀行將錢取出來。未必真是這樣，我們先假定如此。如果中國失去美國這個客戶，它能做什麼？
中國處于一種必須使它的客戶滿意的狀態之中，每天都在努力。現實卻是，全世界都在擺脫對中國的依賴，中國卻無法不依賴全世界。
這些現實把我們帶回第二個方面，中國經濟問題中更加嚴重的那一部分。地緣政治規則的第一條是確保漢族中國的統一。第三條是保護海岸。鄧的賭注是他能夠開放海岸的同時不擾亂漢族中國的統一。19世紀時，沿海地區非常富裕。內地一直特別貧困。沿海地區廣泛參與全球經濟，內地卻沒有辦法。北京正在重新平衡沿海和內地。
沿海地區的利益和進口商及投資者的利益是緊密相關的。北京的利益是保持內部穩定。壓力增大時，它必須加強對沿海地區政治和經濟的控制。內地的利益是取得從沿海轉移給他們的資金。沿海地區的利益是擁有自己的資金。北京希望使兩方都能滿意，不要使中國分裂，也不要動用毛時代的嚴厲措施。但是糟糕的國際經濟現狀減少了對中國產品的需求，也壓縮了中國施展才能的空間。
這第二個問題來自于第一個。假設當前全球經濟不會衰落，維持在某一點上，中國出口大幅下滑，北京不得不在內地資金緊缺和沿海受到重創之間平衡。千萬不要忘記，9000萬中國人生活在內地，只有4000萬生活在沿海地區。這點將影響到平衡，沿海動搖了財富的分配使內地對政權會產生實質的威脅。內地是中國的主體，沿海擁有國際貿易體系。君主們已經被少數因素絆住了。
結論
地理和政治是地緣政治的基礎。政治建立在軍事和經濟之上。這兩者互相作用互相支持但是最終還是分開的。中國鞏固緩沖地區一般來說能夠消除軍事威脅。留下的問題對中國來說是長期存在的，涉及到東北滿洲地區和太平洋地區的平衡。
中國的地緣政治問題是經濟。第一個地緣政治規則，保持漢族中國的統一，和第三個，保衛海岸，是深受經濟影響而非軍事影響的。中國的內部和外部政治問題都和經濟有關。上個時期的經濟的瘋狂增長是無情的地區化的。發展使沿海地區受益而中國人的主要部分——內地被丟在了後面。這也使中國在無法控制和適應的全球經濟中暴露出弱點。這在中國歷史不是第一次，過去的解決方法導致了地區分割和中央政府被削弱。鄧的賭博被繼任者接替了。他移交了。而他們還要玩下去。
擺在面前的疑問是中國的經濟基礎是立國之本還是平衡補償。如果是前者，中國經濟將長久發展。如果是後者，每個人最終都會陷落。立國之本的證據不多。絕大多數的中國人，那些收入不足100美元/月的人們，都被排除在外了。這終究還是一種平衡補償，會對中國地緣政治的第一條規則——維護漢族中國的統一產生威脅。
譯︰智威/簡介
窺本文知中國地緣政治全貌。作者通過軍事和經濟兩方面的分析，指出中國以出口導向的政策所蘊含的巨大危險。反觀不少中國學者大力提倡“金融危機是中國崛起的歷史機遇”實屬妖言惑眾。中國人需要更加現實。掃平貪官污吏，將收繳的巨額財富轉變為社會保障基金。改變政府與民爭利的現狀，再談霸權也為時未晚。當前關于國富民窮的議論不絕于耳，相信政府不可能不知道。本文可以提供了解這一現狀的一條思路。
無論我身處世界哪個地方，在南非、歐洲或者和拉荷亞，我總會被問到同一個問題“中國怎麼樣？”以及隨之而來的輕輕的驚嘆。過去中國所積聚的影響力，正在搖搖晃晃的日益增速。在石油、礦石、耕地、股票或者債券市場，你必須和中國政府領導的擁有一萬億美元基金的機構競價。在這些市場，中國逐步成為最重要的參與者。底線︰無論你是否正在充滿氣罐還是交易信用違約互換，中國的決定影響著你的袖珍寶典。
最清楚不過的事情是，在基本情況不會改變的時候必須看到中國的長期需求。我的朋友George Friedman和他在斯坦福德的團隊是這方面的行家里手。他們的地緣政治研究並不在意流行的觀點，而是集中發現國家政策背後的真實驅動力。這對中國市場來說特別重要，因為傳統的財務狀況分析是不可能的，利潤動機也不適用。
星期一，George和他的團隊將發布他們的地緣政治研究專著系列的第二篇——中國的地緣政治。我已經收到這份報告的副本，這將是我們雜志的特別版。你知道中國是個孤島嗎？想知道他們國家財富之後的戰略嗎？對西藏和達爾富爾的政策？加入Stratfor吧。你可以得到一整年的Stratfor的洞見，加上關于中國的地緣政治和其他地緣政治專著。
下面這張地圖顯示中國如何是孤島。太迷人了。這不過是George用以說明中國如何組成的諸多地圖中的一張。我希望你發現這報告多麼有趣。
編輯 John Mauldin
被封閉的巨大力量: 美學者眼中的中國地緣政治(組圖)
中國是個島國
中國的地緣政治︰被封閉的巨大力量
當代中國是個島國。盡管並非被水包圍（只有東側是海洋），中國周邊的地勢使它從任何方向都很難接近，只有少數地方能夠進入中國。不過為了了解這個國家，我們必須從那些包圍它的山區，叢林和荒地開始。這些堅固外殼包容了並保護著中國。
中國內部可以分為兩個部分︰核心腹地和圍繞著的緩沖區域。中國有一條15寸的等雨量線。在這條線的東部年降雨量大于15寸，西部則小于15寸。大批中國人居住在這條線的東部和南部。這即是中國的核心腹地，大多數中國人生活的地方，漢族人的家。這有助于了解為什麼超過十億的中國人住在只有美國一半面積的地方。
這片腹地分成南北兩部分，並形成了兩種主要的方言，北方的普通話和南方的廣東話。兩種方言的書寫方式是相同的，但是談話時幾乎無法相互了解。這片地區有兩條主要的河流，北方的黃河和南方的長江，還有一條長度排在第三位的南方的珠江。這里是中國的農業地區，然而有關于中國的最重要的因素是，人均耕地面積只有世界水平的三分之一。這種壓力造就了近代中國歷史——必須在這里生活，又試圖超越這片土地。
一圈少數民族地區圍繞著腹地——西藏、新疆（維吾爾穆斯林的故鄉）、內蒙古和滿洲。歷史上，這些緩沖地區在中國強盛時被統治，衰弱時則脫離。今天，大量的漢族人安置在這些區域。這是矛盾的一個原因，不過今日漢族人已經足夠強大了。
這些區域在中國古代構成了威脅。漢族中國富含江河雨水，農民和商人較多，而環繞著多是游牧民族。13世紀，成吉思汗率領蒙古侵略並佔據了漢族中國的一部分。直到15世紀，漢族才重新奪回了主權。這個時期之後，中國人的策略保持著一致︰緩慢系統的維護對外部區域的統治以防遭受到游牧騎兵的攻擊。這種規則改變了中國的對外政策。
還有另一個原因。除了提供緩沖之外，這些領地還可以提供防御邊界。有了這片邊界地區，中國就可以高枕無憂。讓我們按照順序看看中國邊界的本質，從東邊沿著南部的越南和緬甸邊界開始。越南邊界是能夠通過大型軍隊和進行大量貿易的唯一邊境。實際上，不久前的1975年，中國和越南進行過一場短暫的邊境戰爭。這里的某些地域在歷史上是中國控制著越南的。然而，南部邊境的其他地方，雲南和老撾緬甸交界處，是難以穿越的丘陵叢林，幾乎沒有道路。大張旗鼓的通過這里是不可能的。第二次世界大戰時，美國試圖建設緬甸公路到達雲南以支援蔣介石。這辦法太困難無法實現。中國在這片區域是安全的。
被封閉的巨大力量: 美學者眼中的中國地緣政治(組圖)
中國的省份
開卡博峰，海撥將近19000英尺，是中國，緬甸和印度的分界。中國的西南邊境從這里開始，背靠著喜馬拉雅山脈。準確來說，中國統治下的西藏是印度和兩個喜馬拉雅山脈國家尼泊爾和不丹的分界線。這條長長的弧線經過巴基斯坦、塔吉克斯坦和吉爾吉斯斯坦，結束于25000英尺海撥的勝利峰。這座巨大山峰是中國、吉爾吉斯斯坦和哈薩克斯坦的分界。這條邊境線能夠通行，不過有點費勁。在歷史上，商隊曾經穿行過部分地區。總體來說，喜馬拉雅山脈阻擋了商貿活動和軍隊入侵。印度和中國，還有中國和大部分中亞地區是彼此隔絕的。
唯一例外的是分界線的下一個區域哈薩克斯坦。這片地區可以通行，但是交通並不發達。經過開發，這里將會變成中國和歐亞大陸之間的主要通道。這段大陸橋中國是可以利用的。問題在于距離。哈薩克斯坦的邊境距離漢族中國的最近的省市也有大概幾千英里那麼遠。而且必須通過人口稀疏的穆斯林領地。這片領地已經表現出挑戰中國的姿態。很重要的是，絲綢之路曾經經過新疆和西面的哈薩克斯坦，這是唯一的通路。
被封閉的巨大力量: 美學者眼中的中國地緣政治(組圖)
中國的地貌
最後，漫長的北方邊境先是和蒙古接壤，然後是俄羅斯，直到太平洋。這段邊境絕對可以通行。其實，中國歷史上發生過一次成功的入侵。當時從蒙古來的游牧騎兵佔領了漢族中國的大部分土地。中國的內蒙古和滿洲作為緩沖地帶保護了漢族中國免受其他攻擊。中國人沒有向北方侵略有兩個原因。第一，歷史上，那邊沒有什麼有價值的東西。第二，南北交通很困難。俄羅斯有兩條鐵路線橫貫西部和太平洋——著名的西伯利亞鐵路和貝加爾湖-阿穆爾河主干線。後者連接著這兩個地區並聯通了西伯利亞鐵路。除此之外，沒有東西向交通方式。也沒有南北向交通方式。確實沒有其他辦法。
從海參崴到布拉果阜司欽斯克的太平洋一帶的俄羅斯邊境是最有可能進入中國的地區。這片區域具備合理的交通條件，人口和相互的其他優勢。如果中國和俄羅斯曾經有過爭端，那麼這個地區將成為中心。如果你從這里向南移動，離開太平洋，將會到達朝鮮半島。中國上次的軍事爭端就發生在這里。
接下來是太平洋海岸。這里有無數的海港，歷史上發生過大量的海洋貿易。很有意思的是，除了蒙古企圖進攻日本之外，中國最主要的海上活動僅僅是為了貿易而進入印度洋，卻被很快放棄了。中國從未成為海上霸權。直到19世紀，沒有出現過強大的海上艦隊威脅中國，所以中國也沒有興趣興師動眾建設海軍。
中國控制了西藏、新疆、內蒙古和滿洲後變成了一個被隔絕的國家。漢族中國只有在東南地區同越南有沖突的可能性。除此之外，周圍的少數民族緩沖地區已經在政治上歸屬中國。第二個沖突地區是東部的滿洲，涉及到西伯利亞和朝鮮。最後是新疆-哈薩克邊境的連接歐亞大陸的開放通路。
自從19世紀中葉西太平洋的歐洲人到達之後，中國最薄弱的地方即是海岸地區。歐洲人以有限的武力為後盾，為著商業的目的侵犯中國後，這場長久而屈辱的戰爭是中國所遭遇的最重大的軍事攻擊。後來，日本人侵略中國，佔據了中國東部的大部分地區，包括在1930年佔據滿洲。盡管軍事力量懸殊，經過多年戰爭，日本仍然無法迫使中國政府投降。漢族中國因著廣闊的面積和密集的人口，是不會輕易屈服的，這是個簡單的事實。無論日本人取得多少勝利，他們仍然無法決定性的擊敗中國。
被封閉的巨大力量: 美學者眼中的中國地緣政治(組圖)
中國的族群語言學發布
中國是難以侵犯的，憑著它的面積和人口，更難以佔據。這也使中國不容易侵犯其他國家——不是絕對不可能，而是相當困難。擁有全世界五分之一的人口，中國能夠與世界隔絕，就像是19世紀英國武力進入之前和毛澤東統治下的那種狀況。這些都表明中國是一種強大的力量，但是和其他強大力量所表現出來的方式不一樣。
中國地緣政治規則
中國有三個壓倒性的地緣政治規則
1在漢族中國地區保持內部統一。
2保持對緩沖地區的控制。
3保護海岸防止外國侵犯。
保持內部統一
中國比其他強大力量更加封閉。中國的人口數量結合著安全的邊境和豐富的自然資源允許它在發展過程中與世界僅需要極少的交流。比如，毛澤東時代，中國成為主要是內部利益驅動的孤島國家，對世界表現出冷漠或者敵意。除去它被卷入朝鮮戰爭以及平定動蕩的緩沖地區，可以說是安全且相對和平的。然而中國內部經歷了周期性的自發產生的混亂。
中國孤島狀態的弱點是貧窮。從人均耕地面積來看，這個封閉的國家是個窮國。人民如此貧窮致使由國內需求帶動經濟發展是不可能的。然而，孤立的國家是很容易被中央政府管理的。中國最大的危險是漢族中國人內部不和。如果這個問題發生了，如果中央政府不夠強大，那些附屬地區將會脫離，中國面對外敵會變得十分脆弱。
中國走向繁榮昌盛必須參與貿易，出口絲綢，銀器和工業產品。歷史上，陸路貿易並未給中國帶來麻煩。絲綢之路允許外國勢力進入中國，隨之產生的財富造成了一定程度的不穩定。但是整體上是能夠被管理的。
工業化的動力改變了中國貿易的地理和它的進程。19世紀中葉，英國率領下的歐洲強迫中國政府開放貿易，由此揭開了中國歷史的新一頁。第一次，太平洋海岸而不是中亞成為世界的連接界面。這極大地動搖了中國。
中國和世界的貿易日益加強後，從事貿易的中國人突然獲得了財富。那些沿海地區的省份，貿易開展的深入的地區，變得相對富裕。而內陸地區（不是指始終貧苦的緩沖地區而是指漢族中國的不靠海岸的省份）仍舊貧窮，有大批為生存而忙碌的農民。
中央政府在平衡沿海和內陸地區的南轅北轍的利益需求。沿海地區，特別是一群富裕的領導階層，希望能夠保持並加強與歐洲，美國和日本的關系。貿易越是緊密，沿海地區的領導階層越是富裕，地區間的貧富懸殊越大。等到某個時候，那些與商人和政治人士有著密切關系的外國人就越來越握有權力，直到超過中央政府對沿海地區的影響力。這種最壞的地緣政治的噩夢變為事實。中國分裂成多個地區，其中一些很快被外國人特別是外國商業利益所統領。北京失去了對國家的控制。必須提醒大家注意，這是日本侵略卻極為奇怪的無法打敗中國的上下文。
毛澤東有三個目標，馬克思主義暫且不談。第一，他想重新統一中國——重新將北京作為中國的首都和政治中心。第二，他想結束沿海地區和其他地區的不平等。第三，他想將外國人驅逐出中國。簡單說，他希望重建一個統一的漢族中國。
毛最初在1927年發動城市武裝起義，後來失敗了。企圖打破中國權貴和外國勢力的聯盟是不可能的。經過長征，他來到中國內地，在這里召集了兼有國家主義和平等主義的大規模農民軍隊。1948年，他回到了沿海地區並驅逐了外國人。毛重新封閉了中國，實行中央集權，接受了必然的現實。中國變成了平等卻非常貧困的國家。
被封閉的巨大力量: 美學者眼中的中國地緣政治(組圖)
中國的人口密度分布
中國最主要的地緣政治的問題在于︰如果要發展，就必須從事國際貿易。而這樣做，又必須使沿海城市成為對外接口。如此沿海城市和附近地區很快富裕起來。外國人對這片區域的影響力增加了。進而外國勢力與沿海的中國人聯合起來開始對抗中央政府的利益。怎樣既參與國際貿易中又避免上述結果是中國始終面臨的挑戰。
控制緩沖地區
在毛升起之前，中央政府力量薄弱，漢族中國始終卷入抗擊日本，解放戰爭和地區分裂之中。盡管滿洲在中國人控制中，甦聯卻控制了外蒙古並將影響力延伸到內蒙古（甦聯的軍事實力遠勝于馬克思意識形態），西藏和新疆漂泊不定。
毛在進行解放戰爭的同時也在為控制緩沖地區奠定基礎。有趣的是，他的第一個動作就是封鎖甦聯在上述地區的利益。毛鞏固了中國共產黨對滿洲和內蒙古的控制，有效地令甦聯出局。新疆在地方武裝首領楊增新的統治下。解放戰爭結束不久，毛就趕走了他，接管了新疆。最後，1950年，毛開始對付西藏。1951年解放西藏。
對緩沖地區的迅速鞏固使毛擁有了免受侵犯的安全國家，這是中國歷代帝王所追求的。控制西藏意味著印度無法穿過喜馬拉雅山脈在西藏高原生根。喜馬拉雅山脈可能發生小規模戰爭，但是沒有人能夠令多種部隊越過高山而且補充供給。只要西藏屬于中國，印度人只能老老實實呆在大山的另一邊。新疆，內蒙古和滿洲是中國和甦聯的緩沖帶。毛是地緣政治家而不是空想主義者，他並不相信甦維埃。面對這些緩沖區，他們無法進攻中國。距離，惡劣的交通，匱乏的資源意味著，如果甦聯進犯中國，在到達漢族中國人口稠密區之前就落入巨大的後勤問題中，只能被迫停頓下來，就像從前的日本那樣。
中國與鄰國越南、巴基斯坦和阿富汗有過小摩擦。但是真正有問題的是滿洲，確切的說是朝鮮。甦維埃政權比起中國人來，更加支持北朝鮮入侵南朝鮮。很難推測約瑟夫‧斯大林當時的想法，但是這想法明顯起作用了。美國人插手進來，擊潰了北朝鮮軍隊，到達了中國邊境鴨綠江。中國人看到肩負先進武器，受過良好訓練的美國軍隊涌入邊界地區，決定阻止他們前進，並予以回擊。三年的殘酷戰爭使中國死傷一百多萬人。從甦維埃政府的角度看，中國和美國之間的戰爭對他們是很有好處的。但是Stratfor的觀點認為，這場戰爭證明中國人對待邊疆地區或者說緩沖地區的侵犯是非常敏感的，因為這是國家安全的基礎。
保護海岸
緩沖地帶嚴密控制之後，沿海成為中國最薄弱的地方，但是並非因為容易侵犯而薄弱。回顧日本侵華的歷史，沒有人會有興趣和實力進犯中國大陸，進行軍隊供給，還希望能夠贏得戰爭。侵略毫無意義。
對中國沿海的威脅是經濟因素，不過似乎也不能稱為威脅。我們已經看到，英國闖入中國最終完結在國家動蕩，中央政府轟然倒塌和內戰之中，而這一切都是經濟繁榮導致的。毛通過閉關鎖國和肅清與外國商人勾結的階級分子解決了這個問題。對毛來說，不願與外國往來是很自然的政策。他認為外國的存在對中國的穩定具有流水沖刷侵蝕底部那般危險。比起混亂，他更喜歡貧困的和諧。他也明白，憑著中國的人口和地理，沒有先進的軍事-工業組合，中國人也足以保護自己免受潛在的攻擊。
他的繼任者鄧小平繼承了能夠控制中國和緩沖地區的強大政府。他感覺到來自改善民生的巨大政治壓力。他心知肚明科技的差距最終會威脅到國家安全。為此他賭下歷史籌碼。中國太貧窮了，內部需求無法帶動經濟發展的現狀他太清楚了。
鄧認為中國能夠向外國資本開放，將中國經濟從農業和重工業重新定位在出口導向產業。這樣做能夠改善人民生活水平，進口技術，培訓中國勞動力。鄧打賭這次將不會導致中國動亂，造成富裕的沿海省份和內地之間的緊張形式，培植地區分割或者置沿海地區在外國統治之下。鄧相信，依靠忠實的軍隊和共產黨組織，維持強大的中央政府就可以避免這些不利局面。鄧的繼任者仍然想辦法維持著這種對政府的忠誠，而不是對制造個人財富的外國投資者的忠誠。這就是一直在玩的賭注。
中國的地緣政治和當前狀況
從政治和軍事的角度看，中國已經達到了戰略目標。緩沖區域是完整的，中國也沒有面臨歐亞方向的威脅。我們能看到西方國家企圖迫使西藏分立以達到陰謀破壞中國安全的目的。不過對中國來說，西藏只是小小的騷擾。中國不可能讓西藏獨立。藏族人無法勝利起義，也沒有人打算侵佔這個地方。同樣的，維吾爾穆斯林也只是對新疆的騷擾而不構成直接的威脅。俄羅斯沒有興趣或者能力進犯中國。朝鮮半島也不能構成直接的威脅。
對中國最大的軍事威脅來自美國海軍。中國變得日益高度依賴海上貿易，而美國根據自已的意願處于能夠封鎖中國港口的地位。如果美國人這麼做了，那將使中國變成殘廢。因此，中國最重要的軍事注意力是使這種封鎖不可能發生。
中國需要幾代人的時間才能建設一支足以對抗美國海軍的海面部隊。僅僅是訓練海軍飛行員有效地實施航空母艦的操作就要花掉幾十年的時間——至少要等到這些受訓者成為艦隊司令和船長。這還沒有考慮到建造航空母艦和適應航空母艦的飛機以及掌握錯綜復雜的航空母艦操作的必須時間。
中國最重要的任務就是加大封鎖的代價致使美國人不再有這種企圖。這是指陸地和潛水艇反艦艇導彈。這種戰略方案是構造一個足夠分散的導彈系統，它本身無法被美國破壞，能夠在足夠的範圍內超長距離攻擊美國，甚至遠至太平洋中心。
這套導彈系統能夠有效就必須擁有分辨和追蹤潛在目標的能力。因此，如果中國人實行這種戰略，他們必須發展空間基礎的海洋偵測系統。這正是中國特別重視的技術。反艦艇導彈和空間基礎系統包括令美國“目盲”的反衛星系統，這些是中國面臨唯一重大的軍事威脅的籌碼。
中國同樣能夠利用這套導彈系統阻止船只進入和離開台灣以實現對其封鎖。但是中國還不具備海上能力使足夠的海軍陸軍登陸並且支持陸地戰斗。而且也沒有能力建立空中優勢越過台灣海峽。中國或許可以折磨台灣但是無法侵佔它。導彈、衛星和潛水艇組成了中國海軍戰略。
台灣給中國造成的主要問題在海洋上。台灣的位置是這樣的，它可以作為海軍和空軍基地阻隔中國南海和東海之間的海上活動，有效地使中國北部海岸和上海被隔離了。當你考慮到琉球列島，這片從台灣向日本拉伸的區域，你會發現只要控制了台灣，不需要海軍力量即可以控制中國北部。
台灣平時對中國來說並不重要，除非它主動產生了敵意，或者和美國這樣的敵對勢力聯合起來甚至被美國佔據。如果這些事情發生，它的地緣政治的位置將給中國造成特別嚴重的問題。台灣也是一個重要的符號象征，是中國重新聚集民族主義的一條途徑。盡管台灣不代表當前的威脅，但是中國不能忽視潛在危險。
中國正在一個區域充當謹慎的擴張者角色——中亞特別是哈薩克斯坦。傳統上這里是絲綢之路的通道。哈薩克斯坦現在處于富含能源的地區，而這是中國工業所急需的。中國人已經主動和哈薩克斯坦建立了商業關系，正在修建通向哈薩克斯坦的道路。這些道路打開了貿易通道，使石油流向這邊而工業產品流向那邊。
中國正在前甦聯地區挑戰俄羅斯的勢力範圍。俄羅斯人容忍了中國快速增長的經濟活動，同時謹慎關注中國轉變為政治霸權。歷史上，哈薩克斯坦是歐洲的俄羅斯阻止中國擴張的緩沖國家，曾經處于俄羅斯統領之下。這個地區必須被嚴密監視。如果俄羅斯開始感到中國在這里地區日益武斷，它將以軍事力量回擊中國的經濟霸權。
中國與俄羅斯的關系在歷史上是很復雜的。第二次世界大戰之前，甦維埃政權企圖操縱中國政治。大戰之後，甦聯和中國的關系從未向某些人所設想的那麼友好。有時這些關系變得直接敵視，比如1968年。當時俄羅斯軍隊和中國軍隊在烏甦里河一帶作戰。俄羅斯人一直擔心中國人進入他們的太平洋地區。中國人擔心俄羅斯人進入滿洲及後方。
因為巨大的後勤成本，兩者不會發生戰爭；他們也沒有彼此進攻的欲望。在當前環境下，謹慎是佔上風的。然而，中國在哈薩克斯坦逐日增加的影響對俄羅斯不是個小問題。他們可能在這里和中國競爭。如果他們這樣做了，這一切將變成嚴重問題。太平洋地區也可能會爆發矛盾，因為毗鄰朝鮮而有些復雜。
這一切都只是理論上的可能性。美國人封鎖中國海岸，利用台灣隔離中國北部，在哈薩克斯坦的對抗——這些可能性中國必須作為最壞的打算考慮進去。實際上，美國並沒有興趣封鎖中國，中國和俄羅斯也不打算為哈薩克斯坦升級競賽。
中國不存在軍事方面的地緣政治問題。只要控制好緩沖區域，它就可以繼承古代的堅固位置，保證安全地位。中國已經實現上述三個戰略性的規則。最薄弱的反而是第一個規則︰漢族中國的統一。這種威脅並非來自軍事，而是來自經濟。
中國地緣政治的經濟狀況
中國來源于地緣政治的問題是關于經濟的，有兩個方面。第一個方面很簡單。中國經濟是出口導向的，因此無法獨立。不管貨幣儲存量多大，技術多麼先進以及勞動力多麼便宜，中國必須依靠其他國家進口商品的意願和能力，還有運輸條件。任何貿易干擾都將直接影響中國經濟。
外國購買中國商品的最重要的原因是價格便宜。產品便宜是由于工資差異。一旦中國失去了這個比較優勢，出口能力即大為削弱。還有其他原因，比如，當前能源價格上漲，產品成本隨之上漲，工資差異的相關重要性即降低了。這種情況到達某個臨界點，中國的貿易伙伴就會衡量進口中國產品的價值還是關閉工廠的政治成本孰高孰低了。
這些都不是中國所能控制的。中國無法控制世界石油價格。它可以利用現金儲備補助工廠的生產成本，但是本質上這不過是把錢送還給消費這些產品的國家。它可以強行價格管制以控制增長的工資，但是這將導致國家內部失衡。中國的核心問題是它已經變成世界工廠，它完全依靠全世界都來選購商品，而不是到其他國家購買。
中國還有其他問題，從不健全的財政制度到被工廠佔用的耕地。但是我們所看到中國的在地緣政治方面的核心問題是︰中國在出口方面越有成效，就越變成它的顧客的人質。一些觀察家已經警告過中國可能從美國銀行將錢取出來。未必真是這樣，我們先假定如此。如果中國失去美國這個客戶，它能做什麼？
中國處于一種必須使它的客戶滿意的狀態之中，每天都在努力。現實卻是，全世界都在擺脫對中國的依賴，中國卻無法不依賴全世界。
這些現實把我們帶回第二個方面，中國經濟問題中更加嚴重的那一部分。地緣政治規則的第一條是確保漢族中國的統一。第三條是保護海岸。鄧的賭注是他能夠開放海岸的同時不擾亂漢族中國的統一。19世紀時，沿海地區非常富裕。內地一直特別貧困。沿海地區廣泛參與全球經濟，內地卻沒有辦法。北京正在重新平衡沿海和內地。
沿海地區的利益和進口商及投資者的利益是緊密相關的。北京的利益是保持內部穩定。壓力增大時，它必須加強對沿海地區政治和經濟的控制。內地的利益是取得從沿海轉移給他們的資金。沿海地區的利益是擁有自己的資金。北京希望使兩方都能滿意，不要使中國分裂，也不要動用毛時代的嚴厲措施。但是糟糕的國際經濟現狀減少了對中國產品的需求，也壓縮了中國施展才能的空間。
這第二個問題來自于第一個。假設當前全球經濟不會衰落，維持在某一點上，中國出口大幅下滑，北京不得不在內地資金緊缺和沿海受到重創之間平衡。千萬不要忘記，9000萬中國人生活在內地，只有4000萬生活在沿海地區。這點將影響到平衡，沿海動搖了財富的分配使內地對政權會產生實質的威脅。內地是中國的主體，沿海擁有國際貿易體系。君主們已經被少數因素絆住了。
結論
地理和政治是地緣政治的基礎。政治建立在軍事和經濟之上。這兩者互相作用互相支持但是最終還是分開的。中國鞏固緩沖地區一般來說能夠消除軍事威脅。留下的問題對中國來說是長期存在的，涉及到東北滿洲地區和太平洋地區的平衡。
中國的地緣政治問題是經濟。第一個地緣政治規則，保持漢族中國的統一，和第三個，保衛海岸，是深受經濟影響而非軍事影響的。中國的內部和外部政治問題都和經濟有關。上個時期的經濟的瘋狂增長是無情的地區化的。發展使沿海地區受益而中國人的主要部分——內地被丟在了後面。這也使中國在無法控制和適應的全球經濟中暴露出弱點。這在中國歷史不是第一次，過去的解決方法導致了地區分割和中央政府被削弱。鄧的賭博被繼任者接替了。他移交了。而他們還要玩下去。
擺在面前的疑問是中國的經濟基礎是立國之本還是平衡補償。如果是前者，中國經濟將長久發展。如果是後者，每個人最終都會陷落。立國之本的證據不多。絕大多數的中國人，那些收入不足100美元/月的人們，都被排除在外了。這終究還是一種平衡補償，會對中國地緣政治的第一條規則——維護漢族中國的統一產生威脅。